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The Utilitarian Role of a Restatement
of Conflicts in a Common Law System:
How Much Judicial Deference
Is Due to the Restaters or
"Who are these guys, anyway?"
HAROLD G. MAIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem judges in choice-of-law cases must necessarily feel some kinship to Butch
Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, waiting for their pursuers to ride over the hill to force
them to move on. The theoretical debate over the scope and meaning of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement")' has regularly
exposed courts who "adopt" that document's approach not only to normal critical
evaluation of the practical results of those decisions but to critical analysis focused
on whether the court had properly applied the "significant contacts-governmental
interests" theory that informs the Second Restatement's recommendations. Such
criticism arose even when the result in the case, as distinguished from the language
used to explain it, was clearly unexceptionable.
This combination of theoretical criticism and functional review necessarily left the
courts, whose principal duty is to arrive at a result in each case that is both rational
and utilitarian, somewhat perplexed about the nature of the task committed to them.
Critiques ofjudicial decisions invoking the Second Restatement are just as likely to
focus on whether the opinion properly articulated the principles and rules of the
Second Restatement as on whether the result in the case made common sense. Judges
who believe it is their principal duty to arrive at just results in the light of prior
decisions in similar cases must necessarily feel a bit confused when it is their
description of the reasons for the result, rather than the result itself, that becomes the
focus of criticism.2
This conflict between the scholar's role as commentator and the judge's role as
ultimate decisionmaker is present throughout much modem conflict of laws analysis.
Thus, an answer to the question whether a new restatement should revisit choice-of-
law theory or whether it should concern itself with synthesizing cases decided under
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville,
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1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
2. This is not to suggest that scholarly criticism of decisional theory is either unimportant
or inappropriate. Rather, the proposition is that a new restatement should start out to synthesize
rules from existing decisions to say what the law (as distinguished from the theory) now is in
various factual contexts. Wherever sufficient case law exists to permit such an exercise, the
new restatement should undertake it. Once this is accomplished, critical analysis of the rules
produced by this synthesis is highly appropriate. But, since the American Law Institute does
not (and should not) attempt to write new law, especially under the guise of issuing a
restatement, it ought to determine what law the lawmakers have made before going on to
recommend other approaches for situations in which authoritative decisionmakers have not yet
acted or have done so erratically without apparrent consistency.
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existing theories is central to determining whether the bar, the academy or the courts
are ready for a new American Law Institute effort in the choice-of-law field.
Before the Restatement of the Law of Conflict ofLaws ("First Reitatemenf')3 was
published in 1934, the idea that the field of conflict of laws cotild provide a
battleground for important scholarly debate might have been rejected out of hand.
Although there were, of course, books and articles stating differing views on private
international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,4 generally choice
of law in the courts was treated as a set of firmly established common law rules with
a limited set of exceptions. In 1935, Professor Joseph Henry Beale, discussing
conflict of laws, could comfortably write: "Pondering over the subject of Conflict of
Laws, after ten years spent in teaching it, the author evolved a Summary of the
subject which in the thirty years that followed he has seen little reason to alter."5
But the quiet certitude reflected in Professor Beale's statement above changed with
the emergence of Legal Realist analysis and the entry of Legal Realist scholars into
the choice-of-law field.6 Those scholars rejected the proposition that a few words in
a legal rule could explain the propriety of the results in cases in which the court was
determining not only the rights of the parties, but the rights of territorial lawmakers
as well.
The rules of choice of law were not, of course, the simple and easy predictors that
their written forms suggested. Rather, those rules oversimplified and, therefore,
obscured a complex interaction of governmental policies and private concerns whose
synthesis did not lend itself to the appealing simplicity of universal conclusory
statements based on general concepts of sovereignty and state authority!
3. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
4. For a useful short survey of this period, see EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICTOF LAWS §§ 2.4-.12 (2d ed. 1992).
5. JOSEPH H. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS at iii
(student ed. 1935).
6. The Legal Realists shifted the emphasis from the language of the law to the results
achieved by authoritative decisionmakers. This shift, in turn, necessarily required analysis
aimed at determining the social impact of the result in a given case and asking which state
should determine whether such an impact should occur. The best known of these scholars in
the conflicts field was Professor Walter Wheeler Cook whose work, culminating in the book,
WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942), strongly influenced the development of the Second Restatement.
7. Perhaps the clearest statement of this proposition is by Professor Hardy Cross Dillard,
The Policy-OrientedApproach to Law, 40 VA. Q. REv. 626, 629 (1964).
The "law" is thus not a "something" impelling obedience; it is a constantly
evolving process of decision making and the way it evolves will depend on the
knowledge and insights of the decision makers. So viewed, norms of law should
be considered less as compulsive commands than as tools of thought or
instruments of analysis. Their impelling quality will vary greatly depending on
the context of application, and, since the need for stability is recognized, the
norms may frequently provide for a high order of predictability. But this is
referable back to the expectations entertained and is not attributable to some
existential quality attaching to the norms themselves. In other words, our concept
of "law" needs to be liberated from the cramping assumption that it "exists" as
a kind of "entity" imposing restraints on the decision maker.
(Vol. 75:541
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Whatever criticisms may be aimed at the two Restatements, together they have
stimulated a great outpouring of scholarly and judicial commentary during the last
seventy-five years. Much of that discussion has taken the form of critiques of the
manner and means that courts have used to implement the analytical processes
recommended by the Second Restatement or, in some instances, defense of the
"simplicity" of the First Restatement (which defense often includes what seems to be
an ill-disguised yearning for the "good old days").
The especially abstract nature of choice-of-law rules makes them peculiarly
appropriate targets for Legal Realist analysis. The impact of that scholarship has
reached beyond the field of conflicts and has contributed significantly to a better
understanding of what the characterization law means in all its various contexts.
Furthermore, the Legal Realist writers have effectively destroyed the proposition that
a reference to law can only mean reference to the verbal form of a sovereign's
normative statements issued by that sovereign's courts or legislature. Holmes's
aphorism that law is what courts do came to life.'
The nature ofthe decisionmaking process in choice-of-law cases makes a definitive
answer to the question "Do We Need a New Restatement?" both important and
difficult. Should we set out to produce a true "Restatement"? Such a restatement
would synthesize the results in cases decided under the principles of the Second
Restatement in order to document and articulate the new rules that describe how
courts have used the governmental interests-significant contacts analysis. Or do we
need a third restatement to review and revise the theories that inform choice-of-law
decisionmaking in order to articulate a more accurate form of analysis for use in
future choice-of-law cases? These questions cannot be answered effectively until we
learn how far we have come on the path from unreasonable rules through a morass
of unruly reasonableness to arrive at an articulation of rules that are reasonable in the
light of the social needs they are designed to serve and in the light of the practical
necessity of assisting courts and lawyers in addressing those needs.
II. THE COMMON LAW METHOD IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict of laws is one of the few remaining areas in which the common law
method holds sway as a principal mechanism for judicial decisionmaking. Because
common law methodology is so prevalent in conflict of laws decisions, a brief review
the nature of that methodology is helpful.9
Id
8. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the
New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 71, 75 (Max Lemer ed., 1989); cf "Rules are not self-applying but are
wielded by people acting as decisionmakers." MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 5 (1981).
9. There is an important distinction between the "common law method" and "The
Common Law." The first refers to the process of decisionmaking used by the king's courts in
medieval England in response to King Henry I's direction to "go forth and do justice in the
name of the crown." The second refers to the body of rules developed by later common law
2000]
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In every case, it is the court's duty to see to it that justice is done to the parties by
ensuring the evenhanded application of an appropriate set of societal norms. The
proposition that parties similarly situated should be similarly treated by the courts is
a fundamental principle ofjustice. At common law, general fundamental legal norms
were originally drawn, not from statutes or royal decrees, but from concepts of social
justice available to the courts (from religion, philosophy, and the judges' experience
as human beings) and applied by them to specific real world situations.
Before the twentieth century, most private law was not statutory but was derived
by the common law method described above. The Common Law's content was stated
in generalized rules that synthesized the results in prior cases decided by the common
law method. Using such common law rules as rules of decision necessarily creates a
connection between past, present, and future judicial action and serves the important
purpose of guiding the court to resolve similar cases similarly. Thus, the need to
formulate rules at common law is directly tied to the importance of consistent
decisionmaking over time.' °
III. TERRITORIALITY AND CHOICE-OF-LAW THEORY
A. The Role of the Territorial State
The development of the territorial nation-state as the principal building block of
world society necessitated efforts by courts to take into account the rapidly increasing
number of lawmaking units whose laws might be relevant to deciding cases that came
before the local fora. Law was thought of as confined by territorial boundaries since
its authority came solely from the will of a territorial sovereign who could not
legislate authoritatively in another sovereign's territory or for her people."
When the number of nation-states with defined territorial boundaries increased, the
frequency of conflicts between the lawmaking authority of sovereigns with respect
to particular situations or persons increased. Consequently, theoretical analysis
became of great importance in conflict-of-laws cases. This was so because decisions
concerning the relevance of competing governmental policies are much more abstract
courts to synthesize the results in past cases to permit easy access to judicial precedent.
Without a set of readily accessible rules, the courts had to rely on their ad hoc understanding
of general principles ofjustice to arrive at decisions in individual cases.
10. The principle of precedent was not invented by King Henry I and given to his courts
by sovereign fiat. When lawyers representing clients before the King's courts came to
recognize that the courts often decided cases by referring to earlier cases for support or
contradiction, the importance of"precedent" began to become evident. Since the courts did not
issue written opinions (hardly surprising in the days before the invention of the printing press),
lawyers began to send their law clerks into the courts on judgment day to take down shorthand
summaries of the words that the court read. See generally 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 532-42 (3d ed. 1923). Thus, most early opinions are quite short. For
illustrations, see 2 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT (1930).
11. "I]t is not the custom of England that anyone answer in the Kingdom of England for
any trespass made in a region outside... ." Hugh la Pape v. The Merchants of Florence Living
in London, reprinted in 2 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 34, 38 [hereinafter Hugh la
Pape].
[Vol. 75:541
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and, therefore, much more difficult to explain, than decisions about whether the
defendant should pay the plaintiff under a given set of local law standards. A brief
review of choice-of-law theory and of the works of earlier "restaters" is helpful to put
the Second Restatement in appropriate perspective and to address the question
whether, at this time, the American Law Institute ("ALl") should begin work on a
third restatement.
B. The Early "Restaters"
The great Dutch scholar, Ulricus Huber, was challenged with an apparent
contradiction between the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty and the need to
use rules of law created by foreign sovereigns in order to facilitate international
economic intercourse by recognizing property (and other) rights created in one
country but asserted in another. 2 He resolved that contradiction by pointing out that,
as a matter of practice (but not necessarily of law), "[t]hose who exercise sovereign
authority so act from comity, that the laws of every nation having been applied within
its own boundaries should retain their effect everywhere so far as they do not
prejudice the powers or rights of another state, or its subjects."' 3 Huber's "comity
theory" became the basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign law and
judgments in English common law." Consequently, the comity theory was "received"
in the United States along with other elements of British Common Law. Justice
Joseph Story made comity the theoretical basis of his early nineteenth century treatise
on private international law. 5 Thus, Story's theory emphasized the importance of a
12. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theoryfor Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 260-61 (1991).
13. D.J. Liewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English
Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49,57 (1937) (quoting ULRICH HUBER, De
Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, in PRAELECTIONES JURIS ROMANI ET
HODIERNI § 2 (1689)); see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV.
375, 375-77 (1918); Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9,26 (1966-
67).
14. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 282-83 (1982). In
Hugh la Pape, supra note 11, the Court refused to hear a claim brought by an English knight
for destruction of his palace on the hills outside Florence, Italy. The palace had been destroyed
as a military measure by the Florentine government. The court wrote: "[lit is not the custom
of England that anyone answer in the Kingdom of England for any trespass made in a region
outside ....I d. at 38. This rule prevailed until Lord Mansfield's decision, based on Huber's
"comity" principle, in Holman v. Johnson, I Cowp. 341, 343-44, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121
(K.B. 1775). For a discussion of how the British courts evaded the otherwise disastrous effects
of the Hugh la Pape rule, see Harold G. Maier, International Issues in Common Law Choice
ofLaw: American Conflicts Teaching Exits the Middle Ages, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 361,
361-63 (1995) [hereinafter Maier, International Issues].
15. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Morris L. Cohen et
al. eds., Arno Press 1972) (1834). Story wrote:
The true foundation on which the administration of international law must rest is,
that the rules, which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and
utility, from a sense of the inconvenience, which would result from a contrary
2000]
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cooperativejudicial attitude toward the use of foreign law to resolve forum cases. The
theory contained an element of "presumed reciprocity" based on a kind of interstate
golden rule: "Apply the local law of another state or nation when, if the
circumstances were reversed, you would prefer that state or nation to apply the local
law of your own forum."
Story's "comity theory" held sway until the late nineteenth century when the
"Theory of Vested Rights" became the accepted justification for choice-of-law
decisions. That theory was little more than a revival of the strict territoriality of
medieval England 6 in reverse. This theory viewed law as functioning automatically,
without the intervention of a court or other decisionmaker, on the occurrence of a
triggering event. Thus, rights vested automatically under a sovereign's law because
the last event necessary to create a cause of action under that law occurred within that
sovereign's territory. Thereafter, the legal rights and duties thus created followed the
parties into whatever forum became the site of the litigation. Since the Vested Rights
theory left little room for policy analysis, it appeared to be particularly amenable to
having its rules set down in a restatement. This was, of course, the First Restatement.
The attack on the First Restatement was led principally by the Legal Realists 7 who
doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order thatjustice may
be done to us in return.
Id. at 34; cf SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM
THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIvE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 28 (New
Orleans, B. Levy 1828).
16. See, e.g., Hugh la Pape, supra note 11. For a brief summary of this case and its role in
early choice-of-law reasoning, see Maier, International Issues, supra note 14, at 365.
17. Perhaps the best known of the Realists in the conflict-of-laws field was Professor
Walter Wheeler Cook. Professor Cook carried the Realist torch throughout the debates in the
ALl while the First Restatement was being drafted and, ultimately, accepted. Cook lost that
battle but not the war. His ideas ultimately provided the theoretical base for the Second
Restatement. Professor Joseph Henry Beale, the First Restatement's Chief Reporter, was the
leading Vested Rights theorist whose policies prevailed in the First Restatement. Professor
Elliot E. Cheatham and his colleague (and former student) Professor Willis L.M. Reese laid
the groundwork and created the format for the Second Restatement in a seminal article entitled
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952). Reese was named Chief
Reporter for the Second Restatement whose format and theory strongly resembles the approach
in the Columbia piece. Although neither Cheatham nor Reese would probably have called
themselves "Legal Realists" their analytical style fits that model precisely. Three other
important influences on judicial interpretations of the Second Restatement were Professors
David Cavers, Brainerd Currie, and Robert A. Leflar, each of whom were important
commentators on court decisions applying the Second Restatement's methodology. Professor
Currie's views on governmental interests analysis eventually won the day when courts began
to use that analysis to determine which contacts were "most significant" as that term is used
in section 6 of the Second Restatement. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y.
1963). It is the relationship between the facts of the case and the states or nations involved that
creates the "governmental interests" that should be reflected in the ultimate result arrived at by
the court. For a summary of the views of most of the principal choice-of-law scholars at the
time that the Second Restatement was gaining a foothold in the courts, see Harold G. Maier,
Coordination ofLaws in a National Federal State: An Analysis ofthe Writings ofElliot Evans
Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REV. 209, 242-5 (1973).
[Vol. 75:541
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had objected to the Vested Rights theory throughout the preparation of the ALl drafts.
The Legal Realists eschewed choice-of-law rules, even as they objected to rules in
general when they were used by courts as general indicators of just results in all
cases. Since their view was that the law was the result of an authoritative
decisionmaking process tied to the specific facts of a case, any "restatement" created
under Legal Realist theory would not restate rules but, rather, would state a
methodology for solving choice-of-law problems. This is, of course, precisely what
the Second Restatement does. The question now before the house is whether a third
restatement should be developed to replace it.
C. The Role of Legal Rules
The policies that inform all legal decisions can be divided into three categories:
governmental system policies, substantive rule policies, and policies of practical
utility. 8 Choice-of-law cases necessarily require the court to determine which
governmental unit's policies will guide the court's decisions. The answer to this
question depends in turn on the systemic values that inform the governmental
organizational framework within which the court represents one of many different
bodies politic, each of which has laid down rules of conduct appropriate to resolving
a dispute similar to that between the parties. In other words, the choice-of-law
question is, which government's policies shall guide the decision in the case? The
Second Restatement sought to establish a method for conducting this search
-nothing more.
The Second Restatement was neither designed nor intended to provide all the
answers to choice-of-law problems. Rather, it was much more concerned with
identifying the proper questions. As the late Professor Willis Reese put it:
Section 6 has both strengths and attendant weaknesses. Its strengths are that it
lists the principal values that are of importance in choice of law. Its weaknesses
stem directly from these strengths. In all but the simplest cases, the values stated
are likely to point in different directions such that the court will be required to
determine which values are of greatest importance for the purpose at hand. In
other words, section 6 is eclectic in that it places emphasis upon a number of
policies or values....
... [I]t cannot be denied that the principal weakness of the Restatement is the
relatively little guidance that it affords. Properly viewed, it is a transitional
document.'9
Criticisms aimed at the Second Restatement because it fails to give definitive
answers are, therefore, necessarily aimed, not at the execution of the Second
Restatement's objectives but rather at the objectives themselves. And to the extent
that the Second Restatement has accomplished its purpose of making Legal Realist
reasoning the touchstone for most judicial decisionmaking in choice-of-law cases, it
has done very well.
18. See Maier, supra note 17, at 246-47.
19. Willis L.M. Reese, American Trends in Private International Law: Academic and
Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REv. 717, 733-34
(1980) (emphasis added).
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It is important to remember that no restatement is ever "law." It has no legal force.
It is, in theory, an educated analysis of what past judicial decisions or legislation say
the law ought to be. This is particularly true in an area in which the common law
method still functions as the principal guide to decisionmakers. A restatement never
becomes law. It can never be anything more than a guide because, whatever the
expertise, acumen, brilliance, or dedication of those who draft a restatement, they
carry no authority to decide what the law is in a controversy between parties.
Restaters are not authoritative decisionmakers. If the words and policies of the
restatement become law, they do so because authoritative lawmakers adopt them, not
because they receive the affirmative vote of the ALI.
There is no evidence that the Reporters for the Second Restatement were at all
disappointed-or had reason to be-with the ultimate results of their labors. It is, of
course, correct that the Second Restatement does not answer all the questions raised
about the appropriate resolution for all choice-of-law scenarios. 20 It was never
intended to do so. But it does describe a useful conceptual process for future
decisionmaking. In so doing, it has freed judicial (and scholarly) attitudes from the
narrow formalism2' reflected in the Vested Rights theory the First
Restatement'-and it has done this admirably! The questions are, therefore, "What
should the American Law Institute do next? Do we need a Restatement (Third)?" I
think the answer is "yes"-but conditionally. The condition is that the new
restatement's reporters begin with an effort to synthesize the results and rationales in
decided cases to find out what the new choice-of-law rules are. This is not the same
as asking, "What analytical principles did the courts follow in arriving at these
results?" Once this collection and synthesis has been done, the need, if any, for new
choice-of-law theories will become much more evident. Perhaps all that is really
needed is more common law method experience with the theories that are already
reflected in the Second Restatement,' the analysis now used in a majority of states.
I propose that the ALI begin by finding out what the conflict landscape really looks
like, where the gaps are, what the courts have actually done. That task might even go
on to critique the existing case law and to make recommendations about how any
holes should be filled. Such a new work should certainly address the question, where
should the courts go next? But, let us first find out where they have actually been?
New restaters should now be concerned with the question, "What have the
authoritative decisionmakers done with the guidance that the ALl has provided for
them and in what choice-of-law categories have they done it?" Once we know the
answer to that question, we will know a great deal more about the current state of
choice of law in the courts ofthe United States and about the direction to be followed
in researching and drafting a third restatement of conflict of laws.
20. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232 (1997); Symeon C. Symeonides,
The Needfor a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J.
437(2000).
21. Judge Roger Traynor called it "the brooding background of a petrified forest." Roger
J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
22. See Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories ofConflict ofLaws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HARV. L. REv. 361, 379-85 (1944).
23. See generally, Borchers, supra note 20.
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